Unite to prevent war | A capabilities-based European NATO as the best path to a European Defense Union

 *This position paper provides a specific vision and set of proposals by Volt for the Future of European Defense, specifically to answer the question how to effectively prepare for the ‘’most extreme military contingencies’’ by 2030.  It does not necessarily reflect the position of the Green/EFA group in the European Parliament, which can be found here. Ultimately, only conflict prevention through civilian missions as part of a human centric security policy can provide a sustainable solution to conflict. For a more holistic and comprehensive position on security as such, please consult the 2022 Greens/EFA Position Paper on European Security and Defence https://extranet.greens-efa.eu/public/media/file/1/7782 

The Union has at most 5 years to prepare for a plausible Russian invasion. Putin is already waging war against a European democracy in Ukraine and is directly attacking EU Member States just under NATO's article 5 threshold to test our resolve and capabilities to respond. Since the Munich Security Conference of 2025, the US has threatened a full retreat from NATO. If a full-scale conventional war would break out today, we would not have the forces and supplies to sustain a long fight and may not be able to rely on a Trump administration to come to our rescue with critical capabilities. This requires the EU to take emergency actions to establish defense readiness to effectively deter or defeat Russia if need be.

At the same time, Europeans want a full European Defense Union. We envision this as integrated European forces with standardised equipment: a capabilities-based EU pillar within NATO that is ready for the 'most extreme military contingencies' as soon as possible, but at the latest by 2030, and can take primary responsibility for the European theater. The most effective way to strengthen European defense while also being in the best possible position to potentially restore a more equitable transatlantic partnership with a post-Trump administration, is for Europeans to take leadership of NATO. 

This future European Defense Union has a competitive and innovative defense sector that produces at scale to equip integrated forces and is a world leader in green defense technologies, including through a well-financed risk-taking culture for breakthrough technologies by the creation of a European DARPA. It provides more bang for buck and interoperability by standardisation, through a jointly procured and financed output plan of specific equipment targets. It has a consolidated but geographically diversified and specialised EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EUDTIB) through the creation of regional defense industrial clusters that are fully integrated into the EU single market, where defense SME's including from smaller Member States can thrive. Joint financing provides the most cost-efficient solution for European taxpayers to meet the defense investment needs of at least 500 billion by 2030. It has a common strategy on arms exports outside the EU to ensure global competition but also total alignment with ethical and security standards. It has strong legal instruments to prioritise and accelerate (infrastructure) projects critical for defense readiness, including for European Mobility. It has joint EU strategic enablers, force multipliers and standing military units that fulfill the needs of the NATO New Force Model. It has the strategic culture, command and control, doctrines and exercises to effectively ensure article 42.7 readiness in full complementarity with NATO's article 5. It is well integrated with the defense sectors of EU candidate countries, especially the Ukrainian defense sector, which has joined the EU and NATO. 

The core message of this position paper is that the most cost-efficient and militarily effective way to defend against 'extreme military contingencies' by 2030 is to create integrated EU forces supplied with jointly procured and financed standardised equipment, including the strategic enablers which only the EU can jointly provide. In this way, we can create globally competitive defense economies of scale, save hundreds of billions in investments, while generating serious forces for Europeans to take primary responsibility for the conventional defense of the European theater, making it the core of a more European NATO and autonomous from the United States.

This paper provides concrete proposals for three priority areas for European defense: emergency defense readiness in times of crisis, a competitive and innovative single market in defense, and the creation of integrated European military capabilities. It also presents ideas for improving the overall governance structure around European defense, and a set of options for fulfilling the identified financing gaps.  

Considering the urgency of preparing for such extreme military contingencies, we support coalitions of the willing of European and NATO partner countries to move forward faster to achieve specific proposals outlined in this position paper if political consensus cannot be reached, or significant legal barriers (CSDP mandate) in the current EU Treaties prevent ambitious action. In general, all the proposals should be open to key non-EU partners from Europe such as candidate countries, the UK and Norway. At the same time, we respect the national constitutional and customary legal conditions for some EU Member States not to be able to participate in some of those initiatives, some of whom are not part of NATO.

Governance and investment

a. The existing governance of EU security and defense is not fit for purpose. It was created in an environment of expeditionary and peacekeeping operations, rather than for conditions of full-scale conventional warfighting against peer opponents such as Russia. The democratic oversight role of the EP is lacking and should be strengthened to ensure transparency, inclusivity and accountability. EP must have full oversight and control of the defence industrial sector and EU-funding in particular, especially now that defense becomes core business for the EU. At the same time, the responsibilities of bodies for defense (industry) across the EU institutions, such as the European Commission’s DG DEFIS, the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the new defense commissioner, are too fragmented, clouding responsibility. What is more: there is no clear role division and joint strategic vision between the EU and NATO; targets often overlap or even contradict. We need a clearer strategy, quicker decision-making and more streamlined coordination bodies. We propose to:

• Update the Strategic Compass in 2025 with a core focus on conventional military deterrence and defense, security assistance to candidate countries and other key EU partners. It should become a clear and quantified European security strategy which also includes a coherent concept of operations, operational doctrines and schedules regular military exercises;

• Empower the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) with the ability to issue mandatory requests for information from Member States intelligence agencies which are strictly necessary to address joint EU threats identified in such a new European security strategy and provide military intelligence to joint capabilities; 

• Create a real joint security strategy between the EU and NATO which clearly integrates NATO and EU threat assessments, capability targets, regional and thematic responsibilities;

• Totally align the EU with the NATO capability targets instead of creating duplications between CDP and NDPP, except for areas where there are clear special interests for the EU only, such as for CSDP missions and required capabilities;

• Appoint the EU defense commissioner as the head of the EDA to ensure a single head of Commission and EDA defense efforts;

• Appoint an EP representative to the new Defense Industrial Readiness Board proposed in the European Defense Industrial Programme (EDIP), where currently none is foreseen;

• Appoint a permanent EU representative to NATO, and make a plan to replace US staff in NATO with non-US staff in case of withdrawal;

• Allow SACEUR to be a European national, to more accurately represent an increased European burden sharing in the force structure, and kick-start a shift in strategic culture and mindset;

• Create a dedicated and permanent EU defense council in the Council of the EU to discuss defense issues, whereas those currently take place in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC);

• Create a European Security Council (in effect a kind of war-cabinet) to, with a mandate by the majority of likeminded countries, informally coordinate actions by those most capable and willing to form a vanguard in European defense integration and potential wartime operations; including at least France, Poland, Germany, The UK, the EU and NATO. They should be supported by their Chiefs of Defence and the Chairs of the EU and NATO Military Committees;

• Eventually, revise the treaties to allow a form of (super) qualified majority voting for CSDP missions, defense funding instruments such as the EPF and military deployments. 

b. The minimum investment required to prepare the EU for the 'most extreme military contingencies' is estimated at around 500 billion for the next 10 years. But if Europe wants to build the capabilities to deter Russia with continued support from US strategic enablers, we need to raise defense spending to about 3,5% GDP. If we are further required to replace those US strategic enablers, defense spending would have to raise to about 5% GDP. Joint borrowing and spending would dramatically cut those costs. Most of that funding cannot wait for the next MFF, entering into force only in 2027, and it is unlikely that Member States will commit to a significant increase in baseline EU defense related expenditures there.  But while investing in defense will be pricy, the costs of failing to provide the capabilities to defeat a Russian attack will be astronomical. Current fragmented national spending makes it more difficult to launch large, capital-intensive or high-risk projects critical to effective defense, creates duplications and wastes investments. It is more important to spend more effectively together than to spend more. Being ambitious in creating integrated European Armed Forces with standardised equipment produced by economies of scale will actually save costs massively to European taxpayers. It would also make efficient 'Eurobonds' more attractive for Member States with a relatively low interest rate, since capabilities will be procured together, not only for Member States with high interest rates which are inherently favourable to joint bonds. At the same time, countries that currently under-invest due to high-interest rates will be able to fill critical capability gaps.  This more efficient option will also free up resources for addressing the other security challenges that affect the lives of European citizens, such as the climate crisis and economic and social security. From a macroeconomic perspective, a debt-funded increase in defence spending can boost European economic activity at a time when external demand may be undermined by potential trade wars. Defence spending can also positively contribute to long-term growth via innovation, when done right. Finally, more joint spending gives less room for corruption, increases the scrutiny role of the European Parliament and makes monitoring and accountability easier. The ideal funding mix is 1) fresh money, 2) not susceptible to single vetoes and 3) allows participation of key EU partners such as the UK, Canada and Norway. A combination of the following options should be pursued:

• Pool parts of existing national defense budgets at EU level in a financial facility which can finance all joint actions that could be imagined in the life cycle of a capability

• Raise defense bonds backed collectively by the EU, channeled into a new off-budget instrument administered by the Commission on the example of the European Peace Facility (EPF). It would be paid back with new own resources;

• Create a frontloading instrument pre-investing the 3% Member State targets of GDP spent on defense. This is effectively 200 billion euro per year. 50% of all additional spending higher than 2% should go to a fund to finance the output plan, Projects of Common European Interest and joint EU forces;

• Issue EU risk assurance to lower interest rates for national projects identified as critical to defense readiness by the Commission;

• Repurpose the European Stability Mechanism for defense, by calling the Eurozone Finance Ministers to use the precautionary instrument for macro-financial risks related to conditions (close to those) of war;

• Seize all frozen Russian Assets and channel them into a special fund for immediate Ukraine related defense investments, including direct investments in the Ukrainian defense industry to allow for mass production of critical defense articles (on the ''Danish model'');

• Issue war insurance for those direct investments into the scaling up of the Ukrainian defense industry;

• Exclude identified critical defense investments (in line with EU and NATO capability targets) from the debt and deficit limits in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), conditional on EU projects;

• Review the mandate of the EIB on dual-purpose and purely military projects to create a stronger signal for private investments in defense projects, while ensuring its lending capacity is fully maintained and its primary focus remains on financing the green transition. This could be partially achieved by making defense investments conditional on projects having a strong green technological component;

• Reserve at least 20% of the next MFF for defense and civil preparedness on all levels (Niinistö report).  

Three proposals for a European Defense Union

1. The EU needs to be ready to defend against the most extreme military contingencies as soon as possible. (Emergency Defense Readiness). 

The Commissioner for Defense's mission letter states the need to prepare for the 'most extreme military contingencies'. The first and final frontline of our best defense is in Ukraine, but current and planned instruments provide insufficient scaling for our defense-industrial production to satisfy Ukraine's immediate defense needs. We need to drastically shift the trajectory of the war and tip the scales, which is now fully a European responsibility. At the same time, peacetime administrative and legal procedures mean we would be too slow in responding to potential future emergency contingencies, which can be civilian, military, or hybrid in nature. Finally, the war in Ukraine shows that having sufficient stocks of ammunition is critical for the ability to sustain a longer war, which EU countries currently lack. The EU is not at war but is also not at peace. We need EU wide emergency instruments that can accelerate projects critical to defense readiness. 

We propose to:

a. Create a clear theory of victory for Ukraine with goals, roadmaps and actions in order to set the conditions for a comprehensive, just and durable peace, on the basis of the Ukrainian victory plan and peace formula  In particular, we should succeed the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) with a new standing instrument to boost the immediate mass production of munition and other critical supplies for Ukraine called WIN (Weapons for Immediate Needs). Such an instrument should focus on very specific projects critical to Ukraine's defense, particularly drones and air defense, artillery and long-range strike ammunitions. It should provide financial incentives for production inside the EU and provide war insurance and direct financing for production inside Ukraine (on the ''Danish'' model). This should be included in EDIP's ''Ukraine Support Instrument''. The rapid integration of the defense sector into the EU single market should be boosted in the Ukraine Facility and EDIP. The latter's Ukraine Support Instrument should primarily focus on immediate battlefield needs, not just long-term capacity building. This initiative can be most efficiently financed by seizing the full 300 billion in frozen Russian assets and turning them into Ukraine defense bonds; 

b. Create the Defense Emergency Accelerator Law (DEAL) a new regulation on the model of the US Defense Production Act so that the EU has a standing legal tool to react quickly to emergency crisis needs. It would standardise previously improvised cases like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), joint vaccine or gas purchasing which relied on article 122 TEU, were very slow and inefficient because bodies had to be created ad-hoc.  Upon a proposal by the Commission or HR/VP and following a vote in the Council, it could be activated for joint procurement of critical defense articles or other supplies, prioritising critical materials for specific supply chains and fast-tracking administrative/legal bottlenecks for the construction of critical (military mobility) infrastructure projects. This new regulation could be integrated into EDIP, where two draft proposals for crisis modes for security of supply are foreseen;

c. Create mandatory national targets for the procurement and storage of equipment which are essential in sustaining intense conventional military operations. If those critical supplies are below the identified minimum threshold: this system would automatically kick in until the storage is filled. This could also help create aggregate demand for long-term procurement contracts, which boosts the competitiveness of the EDTIB. The Commission should provide financial support for Member States with limited fiscal capacity, conditional on the funding being spent through joint procurement. Member States who meet their mandatory storages might qualify for preferential access to EDIP or related EU defense instruments. For this short-term measure, purchases from non-EU partner countries which produce at scale and can provide off-the shelf equipment (such as South Korea) should be allowed for critical capability targets, while building up European alternative as soon as possible. Its legal basis could be article 114, 122 or 173 TFEU. At the same time, it should be made complementary to 'WIN' so EU stockpiling does not jeopardise the immediate delivery of critical defense articles to Ukraine, but incentivises it. Sufficient warehouse capacity should be made available.

2. The EU can create more 'bang for buck' by standardising research, development and production. (Single Market for Defense). 

      The European Defense Fund (EDF) and national defense innovation budgets are too fragmented and small to create meaningful breakthrough technologies which could create new European champions and benefit society at large. EU members spent only 4.5 per cent of their defence budgets on R&D, totalling $11.8 billion, while the US spent $138.9 billion in 2023, amounting to 16 per cent of its $847 billion budget. Only 8% of that European R&D is spent collaboratively, failing the 20% target figure. At the same time, they have failed to radically consolidate EU defense markets and often remain hostage of national lobbying. The defense industrial base of the EU is still heavily nationalised and inefficiently spread out over different countries, with the principle of 'juste retour' preventing the creation of real transnational economies of scale. There is no sufficient demand for large-scale orders of standardised equipment types which could equip EU armed forces in a more cost efficient and effective way. All of this also creates financial inefficiencies which are a burden to EU taxpayers, while preventing the scaling up of competitive industries which could improve the competitiveness and productivity of the European economy at large. in 2022, the overall cross-border activity in the Single Market represent 47% of the activity, while for Defence, it is only 15%. 

We propose to:

a. Create an output plan of a specific number of priority capabilities to meet the NATO Capability Targets by 2030 (e.g. a set number of tank, fighter, frigate systems, and strategic enablers) which would then be jointly procured and financially incentivised throughout the life cycle of the product by the European Commission, through a new off-budget facility. This can best be done by creating a Defense Industry Authority (as proposed by the Draghi report) to procure on behalf of Member States, who have identified capability targets. Contractors win competitive contracts, with the failed competitors being included as subcontractors. This would be cost efficient because it would prevent price spiraling over inter-industry competition for contracts and create aggregate demand for investment in more secure long-term production chains by industry, creating economies of scale and thus driving down prices. Such a plan can only work if it is combined with a clear arms export strategy (by making it conditional on the eight arms export criteria), both to stimulate a globally competitive industry, but also to create a common rulebook on ethical and security standards. There should be maximum export targets to guarantee security of supply. The monitoring and control of exports should be enforceable by the Commission and the European Court of Justice at EU level through a new regulation; 

b. Strengthen the successor to the EDF after 2027 with AERIS (Accelerator for European Research, Innovation, and Security) an 'EU DARPA'; an accelerator hub for research, development and testing of new breakthrough defense technologies, bringing together industry, knowledge and government actors. Allocated funding should be focused on a few very specific projects to create and scale new defense technologies, to leapfrog the usual industrial fragmentation which exists in legacy sectors. A dedicated percentage should be reserved for projects that create new green technologies that foster a globally competitive European decarbonised defense sector, and for projects which create non-nuclear deterrence capabilities (AI, offensive cyber). To incentivise buy in from industry, organisations participating in projects should receive IPR's for completed projects for a select number of years;

c. Create Euregional EDTIB clusters uniting research, development, production and maintenance facilities to ensure the practical integration of national defense industries by select areas of technological specialisation. It should be aligned with EDIP’s proposal for the Structure for European Armament Programme (SEAP). This would replace the current system of mandatory contract sharing for EU projects which often only exist on paper. It would consolidate industry into globally competitive European champions. They would be strategically spread throughout Europe to allow continued manufacturing in times of crisis, which would further improve the resilience and economic added value of the EDTIB, in particular for defense industry SMEs in Member States on the Eastern Flank. It would allow Member States and industry to leverage unique strengths while stopping fragmentation, through tech-transfer, compensation and industrial cooperation. This would also end inefficient national 'offsetting' policies. Effective clusters should be reinforced by e.g. EU financial investments and IPR privileges to enable upscaling.

3. The EU should be able to provide for its own core defense interests when it needs to. (Integrated Armed Forces).

It does not suffice to equip 27 national armies more efficiently and at scale. There is a massive gap between the force structure of Russia (200+ brigades) and the EU (50+ brigades). More integrated forces can accelerate the force generation targets which we already have under the NATO NFM. This isn't the creation of a fully integrated 'European Army', which will take decades, but an effective and accelerated way to meet already identified force generation targets.  The EU does not have a strong joint military culture, from the tactical to the strategic level. This weakens interoperability and operational effectiveness in the field. Most soldiers prefer what works well, not from which Member State equipment or procedures come from. This means stronger joint education, command and control, exercises and operational planning. We need a European military culture from recruitment to retirement, with a strong human security tradition. The Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) is a joint force made up of Member State capabilities assembled on an ad hoc basis, which leads to the same historical problems encountered by the EU battlegroups; long lead times, insufficient interoperability, and fragmented logistical support, which leads them to become de-facto useless for deployment in crisis situations. Reaching the NATO Capability Targets of 49 additional combat brigades by 2030 is an ambitious target which can only be achieved if we pool and integrate capabilities by creating a corps-sized standing EU force. This also has very good synergy with the output plan: if a corps-sized force requires standardised equipment, then it creates a clear and large scale demand on industry to produce. A community-led, trained and equipped force would massively streamline logistics, enhance operational effectiveness and enable actual rapid deployment. It could also serve as a credible deterrent capability to protect Ukraine on the path to full NATO and EU membership. Projects of Common European Interest are essentially key strategic enablers and force multipliers to enable defense in a large-scale conventional war with Russia, where we currently rely completely on the US and where it is impossible to procure and operate them by single EU Member States due to their scale, costs and complexity. These have to be created and organised jointly.

a. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) should be turned into a credible EU joint command structure which can provide effective corps-level leadership over interoperable national units. It should be expanded with an EU military academy, expanded permanent staff and additional command and control functions. It should create a coherent concept of operations, operational doctrines and organise exercises around article 42.7 scenarios and military crisis management abroad, with a special focus to assist candidate countries. It would include a standing military intelligence capability that can issue binding and timely delivered specific information from national intelligence agencies. Such a command-and-control function for joint EU units should and can be fully compatible with NATO structures and force availability, exemplified by existing multinational NATO corps; 

b. Jointly procure and fund specific Projects of Common European Interest, which can then be operated with multinational crews. This includes many capabilities, including AWACS, aerial refueling, long range transport, C4 capabilities and space assets critical to early warning, navigation, observation and communication. However, projects should be selected based on the most immediate capability gaps, which also allows for focused funding. Those most urgent projects should at least include;

1. The creation of a comprehensive European air defense system, by coordinating, jointly procuring and funding the new air defense and long-range strike initiatives (ESSI and ELSA), making sure they are fully compatible and complementary. An effective long-range strike component will also make effective air defense much less expensive than the 500 billion currently envisaged. As we have also seen in Ukraine, it is simply cheaper to take out enemy launching platforms while intercepting critical threats, than trying to cover the entire EU territory with defensive systems without taking out the enemy offensive capability. A defensive patriot missile is 3x as expensive as an offensive ATACMS missile. It would also fill the need for a credible European deterrent capability which does not rely on nuclear weapons sharing or transfer of command and control over them. Priority should be given to an immediately scalable European long range strike option, followed up later by a next generation European missile;

2. The creation of an effective Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and electronic warfare capability. NATO’s and its European component’s biggest asset is its air power. Especially in the intermediate term as NATO reconstitutes its capabilities and generates mass, ensuring air superiority is critical to bridge the gap until those capabilities are generated. Currently only the United States can provide the critical SEAD capability to enable it.  

3. The creation of a multi-type European drone force, in close cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB. For it to be effective in transforming the military, as we have seen in Ukraine, drones should be integrated in all levels of the force structure, reflecting different requirements in drone types. This includes reconnaissance, electronic warfare, interceptor and bomber variants.

c. Establish a corps-sized standing EU force of around 10 brigades. This force would be created by transforming the existing Eurocorps into a standing command focused on deterrence and defense with EU-level full-time staff, command and control, Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistics, and strategic enablers. National brigades would be attached to this corps, with fully interoperable and standardised equipment procured and owned by the Commission. The force will be pre-deployed to a specific geographic area (similar to the NATO multinational corps) where it will regularly exercise primarily for article 42.7 and article 5 scenarios. It would essentially be a standing capability contribution to the 1st and 2nd tiers of the new NATO NFM, where multinational force generation is encouraged. Smaller Member States cannot generate effective brigades, so this force would essentially constitute a standing collection of national brigades under a permanent EU command, by transforming the existing Eurocorps. It should include land, naval, air and space assets, CEMA, strategic enablers and force multipliers to provide a full spectrum force package. It would include an EU Joint Cyber Unit with both defensive and offensive capabilities for peacetime (counter FIMI) and wartime purposes. Elements of this standing corps can also be drawn upon to conduct military crisis management abroad under CSDP. This would be different from the RDC, which is an ad-hoc intergovernmental force.